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Effect of a Remedy Limitation Clause on
Specific Performance: S.E.S. Importers, Inc.
v. Pappalardo
VICTOR GARTENSTEIN* and LESTER B. HERZOG**
I.

Introduction

Specific performance is an equitable remedy whereby a contracting party is compelled to fulfill its obligation precisely as
set forth in the contract.' Where the contract concerns the conveyance of real property,' the remedy of specific performance allows a court of equity to force a recalcitrant seller to convey the
property to the buyer, according to the terms of the contract.3 A
court will only grant the remedy of specific performance, however, if the seller is in a position to comply with the court's or'
der.' If the seller cannot convey marketable title to the property
at the time of closing but can convey such title at the time of
trial, the buyer's right to specific performance can be enforced.'
In S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo,"the buyer's remedy to
specific performance was preserved because title was marketable
at the time of trial despite an express contractual provision limiting the buyer's remedies.7 In reaching its decision, the New
York Court of Appeals held that the contingencies for limiting
* J.D., 1967, Brooklyn Law School.
** Certified Public Accountant; M.B.A.,

1977, Long Island University; Candidate

for J.D., 1983, Brooklyn Law School.
1. See generally J. PoMERoY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (3d ed. 1926). The primary criterion in determining whether it is appropriate to grant an equitable remedy such as
specific performance is the inadequacy of available legal remedies. Id. at § 9.
2. Every parcel of real property is conclusively presumed to be unique; consequently, the legal remedy of damages is deemed inadequate. See, e.g., Kitchen v. Herring, 42 N.C. 190 (1851).
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Saperstein v. Mechanics & Farmers Say. Bank, 228 N.Y. 257, 126 N.E.
708 (1920).
5. Haffey v. Lynch, 143 N.Y. 241, 249, 38 N.E. 298, 300 (1894).
6. 53 N.Y.2d 455, 425 N.E.2d 841, 442 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1981).
7. Id. at 462, 425 N.E.2d at 845, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 457.
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the buyer's remedies never arose because the seller was able to
convey marketable title at the time of trial.'
9 is a case of first imS.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo
pression for the New York Court of Appeals. This article will
analyze both the majority and dissenting opinions before concluding that the majority was correct in allowing the buyer to
sue and awarding him the remedy of specific performance.
II.

Facts"0

The plaintiff, S.E.S. Importers, Inc. (S.E.S.), contracted to
buy a building from the defendant, Pappalardo, whereby Pappalardo was to convey a fee simple to the premises, free and
clear of all encumbrances. According to an attached rider to
the contract which referred to a pending action between Pappalardo and two tenants, 2 S.E.S. was not obligated to close title
until "(a) the below action [was] determined in favor of the
landlord and no appeals [were] pending, (b) the tenancy below
[was] terminated, (c) the lease referred to below [was] terminated and cancelled."1 8 In addition, the contract provided:
If, for any reason not the fault of the seller hereunder, seller
8. Id at 467, 425 N.E.2d at 847, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 459.
9. 53 N.Y.2d 455, 425 N.E.2d 841, 442 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1981).
10. All facts, unless otherwise indicated, have been taken from the New York Court
of Appeals opinion, S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d 455, 455, 425 N.E.2d
841, 442 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1981).
11. Id. at 459, 425 N.E.2d at 843, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 455. Pursuant to the terms of the
contract, buyer placed a down payment deposit in escrow with the seller's attorney. The
latter was fired by the seller prior to the closing and shortly thereafter he died. His
estate was joined by the seller as a third party defendant. Id. at 462, 425 N.E.2d at 844,
442 N.Y.S.2d at 457.
12. The contract contained the following representations concerning one of the vacant units:
Seller represents that there was a lease covering the four (4) room suite, shown as
a dwelling apartment upon the Building Department files and records, on the
second floor, with Patrick Simonetti and Anthony Moscatiello. That a Summary
Proceeding was instituted in the Civil Court, Queens County, Housing Part. That
originally a Final Order and a Warrant were issued; and an application made by
tenant Moscatiello to vacate same. That an appeal is now pending in Appellate
Term, Second Department, from Order of Judge Herbert J. Miller. That tenants
have paid no rent on such apartment since September 1977.
Record at 307.
13. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 459, 425 N.E.2d at 843, 442
N.Y.S.2d at 455.
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cannot convey title in accordance with the terms of this contract,
the purchaser shall, at its own election, have the right to accept
such title as the seller is able to convey, without any claim on the
part of the purchaser for abatement of defects or objections, or
the purchaser shall have the right to rescind this contract, upon
which rescission, . . . purchaser will be entitled to the return of
the amount paid at the time of signing of this contract, plus the
net cost of title examination, if incurred, . . . and upon such repayment this contract shall be null and void."
At the closing,15 the buyer refused to accept title tendered
by the seller, charging the seller with bad faith '6 in two aspects

of the deal. The first allegation was based on the continuing existence of the disputed tenancy. The buyer claimed that the
seller was responsible for the continuation of the title impediment, the termination of which was made an express condition
precedent to closing title." The buyer's second allegation of bad

14. Id. at 460, 425 N.E.2d at 843, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 455. In addition, the contract
provided:
That the purchaser, at least ten (10) days prior to the closing of title, .... shall
furnish to seller's attorney, a written statement and notice of objections to title, if
any, and the parties agree that the seller shall have a reasonable adjournment of
the closing of title for the purpose of removing any such objections ....
Id. at 459-60, 425 N.E.2d at 843, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 455.
15. The closing date specified in the contract was July 17, 1978. With the acquiescence of both parties, nothing took place on that date. Subsequently, seller replaced his
attorney. His new attorneys sent a letter to the buyer's attorney on September 21, 1978,
fixing the closing date for September 29, 1978 (closing date referred to in the text). They
also advised him that the buyer's failure to close on that date would constitute default
and would terminate the contract. The buyer's attorney responded by letter on September 25, 1978, referring to the clause which provided that the buyer was not obligated to
close until the landlord-tenant matter was cleared up. See supra text accompanying
notes 12-13. The letter also requested that seller's attorneys forward to buyer evidence
that the tenancy had been terminated. Although that request was not complied with,
buyer and his attorney, nevertheless, appeared at the scheduled closing and represented
themselves as ready, willing and able to consummate the sale pursuant to the terms of
the contract. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 460-61, 425 N.E.2d at
844, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
16. See Brief for Appellant at 16. The courts found that the seller's inability to
convey good title was not occasioned by bad faith. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo,
53 N.Y.2d at 462, 425 N.E.2d at 844, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 456-57. See infra text accompanying note 42.
17. The court of appeals agreed that termination of the title impediment was made
an express condition precedent to closing title. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53
N.Y.2d at 463, 425 N.E.2d at 845, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 457. The trial court had held, conversely, that "[tiermination of the lease was not a condition of the contract, the failure of
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faith was that the seller attempted to withdraw from the deal by
deliberately scheduling the closing on a date when he knew he
would be unable to convey a marketable title as required by the
contract."' His alleged purpose was to force the use of the remedy limitation clause, so that the buyer had to rescind the contract or accept the defective title without an abatement in the
contract price. 19 The buyer maintained that these facts justified
his refusal of the tendered title.20
The seller claimed that neither title to the property nor the
buyer's prospective ownership interest was impaired because the
disputed tenancy had been terminated prior to the execution of
the contract, and the pending landlord tenant action pertained
solely to unpaid rent.2 The seller further claimed that even if
the tenancy was not terminated at the time of closing, the buyer
was forced by the remedy limitation clause to make a preclusive
choice between rescission or acceptance of the defective title
without an abatement in the contract price.2" Accordingly, the
seller countercharged the buyer with bad faith for seeking to
postpone the contractually mandated election for speculative
purposes.28
III. Procedural History
Within two weeks of the aborted closing, the buyer filed a
which would excuse plaintiff's duty of performance. Instead, an outstanding lease at the
time of closing as set in the contract required a reasonable adjournment in the time set
for the concurrent performances." S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Papalardo [sic], 183 N.Y.L.J.
54, Mar. 19, 1980, at 13, col. 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 6, 1980). The court was alluding to
the provision set forth in note 14 supra, and also to the buyer's failure to attend a rescheduled closing set for October 20, 1978. Id. The trial court, however, failed to point
out that the closing date fixed by the seller did not allow for a ten day notice as required
by the provision, supra note 14, and also, that the buyer initiated the lawsuit prior to the
date of the rescheduled closing, on October 12, 1978. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 461, 425 N.E.2d at 844, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 456. But see infra note 40.
18. See Brief for Appellant at 16; S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d
455, 425 N.E.2d 841, 442 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1981).
19. See id.
20. The trial court disagreed with the buyer's contention. See supra note 17.
21. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 462, 425 N.E.2d at 845, 442
N.Y.S.2d at 457.
22. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Papalardo [sic], 183 N.Y.L.J. 54, Mar. 19, 1980, at 13,
col. 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 6, 1980); see supra text accompanying note 14.
23. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 466, 425 N.E.2d at 847, 442
N.Y.S.2d at 459.
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notice of lis pendens2 4 and instituted an action seeking to compel the seller to convey either good title to the premises or such
title as he could convey, but with an abatement in the contract
price. The seller's answer denied all of the buyer's material allegations, and contained several counterclaims for compensatory
and punitive damages resulting from the buyer's refusal to close
title, or otherwise terminate the contract according to its
25
terms.
The trial court held that the continuing existence of the disputed tenancy was a valid objection to the title tendered at the
closing2 but it was not a condition precedent to closing title.2
Having found no evidence of bad faith by the seller, however,
the trial court held that the buyer was limited to the remedies
provided by the clause.2 8 The buyer deprived himself of the
right to ask for specific performance by failing to elect a remedy
and by instituting a lawsuit seeking an abatement in the contract price.2 9 The court found that the buyer's demand for an
abatement contravened the contractual terms, and constituted
the buyer's election to rescind the contract, and to receive a refund of his down payment plus title examination costs.3 0 The
court, therefore, denied the relief sought by the buyer.3 " Furthermore, by holding that the buyer could not compel specific
performance even without an abatement, the court found no
need to discuss the effect, if any, of the fact that the title defect
had been cured at the time of the trial.3 2

24. A notice of lis pendens is a notice filed on public records for the purpose of
warning all persons that the title to certain property is in litigation, and that they are in
danger of being bound by an adverse judgment. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 840 (rev. 5th
ed. 1979). See N.Y.Civ. PRAC. LAW § 6501 (McKinney 1980) and commentary at 438;
N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. LAW § 1331 (McKinney 1979).
25. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 461, 425 N.E.2d at 844, 442
N.Y.S.2d at 456.
26. Id. at 462, 425 N.E.2d at 844, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
27. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Papalardo [sic], 183 N.Y.L.J. 54, Mar. 19, 1980, at 13,
col. 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 6, 1980). But see supra note 17.
28. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 462, 425' N.E.2d at 844, 442
N.Y.S.2d at 456-57. The clause expressly provides that it is applicable only in the absence of bad faith by. the seller. See supra text accompanying note 14.
29. Id. at 462, 425 N.E.2d at 844, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 456-57.
30. Id.
31. Id. The court also denied judgment on the seller's counterclaims. Id.
32. Id. The buyer's theory was that the equitable remedy of specific performance
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The appellate division affirmed the findings and judgment
of the trial court in all material respects.33 But the court of appeals, in a five to two decision, reversed the lower court." The
majority held that the denial of specific performance was an
abuse of discretion, and ordered the entry of judgment for specific performance in favor of the buyer. 5
IV. Court of Appeals Decision
On appeal, the seller reiterated his primary contention that
the disputed tenancy was terminated prior to the execution of
the contract because the tenants had physically departed from
the premises" and the buyer was allegedly aware of this at the
time of contracting.8 7 Dismissing the seller's argument as being
should be granted since "'the court in equity decides the case as of the time the case is

before it.'" Id. at 461, 425 N.E.2d at 844, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
33. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 79 A.D.2d 653, 433 N.Y.S.2d 833 (2d Dep't
1980). The appellate division merely modified the judgment of the trial court with respect to the escrow deposit. Instead of ordering the seller to return the down payment to
the buyer, the appellate division ordered that the payment be made directly by the executrix of the estate of the escrowee. Id.
34. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 462, 425 N.E.2d at 845, 442
N.Y.S.2d at 457. Judge Jones wrote the majority opinion, in which Judges Jasen,
Gabrielli, Wachtler, and Meyer concurred; Judge Fuchsberg wrote the dissent, in which
Chief Judge Cooke concurred.
35. Id. at 468, 425 N.E.2d at 848, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 460.
36. Id. at 462, 425 N.E.2d at 845, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 457. It is the issuance of a warrant
for the removal of a tenant, and not its execution, that terminates the existence of the
landlord-tenant relationship. N.Y. REAL PROP. AcTs. LAW § 749(3) (McKinney 1979).
Here, a warrant for the removal of the tenants had been issued. Still pending was the
seller's appeal from an order staying the final order and warrant. See supra note 12. The
seller relied on various statements made by New York courts to the effect that a tenant's
voluntary departure, after being served with a notice of petition, terminates his tenancy
with the same force as would his involuntary removal by execution of a warrant. See,
e.g., Cornwell v. Sanford, 222 N.Y. 248, 253, 118 N.E. 620, 621 (1918), where the court
stated: "[tihe removal is the precise act and effect the landlord sought through the service of the precept and proceeding, and it is entirely immaterial, within the law, whether
it is produced through the warrant or the conduct of the tenant in obedience to the
precept." Id. See also Hoffmann Brewing Co. v. Wuttge, 234 N.Y. 469, 138 N.E. 411
(1923); International Publications, Inc. v. Matchabelli, 260 N.Y. 451, 184 N.E. 51 (1933);
3 J. RAscH, N.Y. LANDLORD AND TENANT § 1400 (2d ed. 1971).
37. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 462, 425 N.E.2d at 845, 442

N.Y.S.2d at 457. Photographs were received into evidence showing the vacant apartment
after the departure of the tenants before the contract was signed. Furthermore, the
buyer's president admitted that he inspected the vacant apartment before the signing of
the contract. Record at 208 and 242.
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contrary to the factual findings of the lower courts,38 the majority held that the tenancy clause39 was expressly made a condi-

tion precedent to the buyer's obligation to close title,"' and be-

38. See supra text accompanying notes 26-32. The lower court held that the title
tendered by the seller did not conform to the terms of the contract.
39. See supra text accompanying note 13.
40. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 463, 425 N.E.2d at 845, 442
N.Y.S.2d at 457. In this respect, the court of appeals overruled the trial court's finding
that the clause did not create a condition precedent. See supra note 28. The court of
appeals' finding indicates that the clause effectively made the contract executory until
the seller obtained a final warrant or until the purchaser, at his option, decided to close
or rescind the contract. This, however, is not the same as stating that the clause imposed
an affirmative duty on the seller to perform work for which the parties did not contract.
In Sloan v. Pinafore Homes Inc., 34 A.D.2d 681, 310 N.Y.S.2d 731 (2d Dep't 1970)
(mem.), the contract provided that if the house was not ready for occupation on the law
day, then the closing was to be adjourned and rescheduled for later, in order to give the
seller a chance to make the dwelling occupiable. Due to an unsafe slope that required the
construction of a retaining wall, the building authorities refused to issue a certificate of
occupancy until the hazardous situation was rectified. The court agreed that the purchaser's objection of failure to deliver premises suitable for occupancy was valid, but
rejected his request for specific performance which was based on the contention that the
provision delaying the closing should be construed as a covenant to perform any and all
acts needed to close. Sloan is distinguishable from the present case because the emphasis
is on the buyer not having an obligation to close, rather than on any affirmative duty of
the seller to perform. It can be said in the present case that the buyer does not seek to
impose on the seller a duty to take affirmative steps to remove the title impediment; he
merely seeks to be free from any duty to perform until the seller fulfills his obligations.
Furthermore, Sloan is distinguishable because the affirmative duty the buyer sought to
impose upon the seller stems from general language which the court properly held should
not be as broadly construed as suggested by the buyer. On this point, there are cases
which imply an affirmative duty sometimes entailing an expenditure of money on the
seller whose duty to convey is only stated in general terms. See, e.g., Mokar Properties
Corp. v. Hall, 6 A.D.2d 536, 179 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1st Dep't 1958), where the court, dealing
with a remedy limitation clause similar to the one in this case, stated:
If the vendor had contracted to convey, .. . if he is able with the reasonable expenditure of money and effort to remedy defects in title and neglects or refuses to
do so, he has not acted in good faith, and he cannot then limit his damages by
shielding himself behind such self-created or easily scaled barriers.
Id. at 539-40, 179 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
The present case, however, contains specific language (see supra the tenancy termination clause set forth in the text accompanying notes 12 and 13) delineating the parties'
rights and obligations with respect to an existing and acknowledged title impediment.
The Sloan case is, therefore, distinguishable because the affirmative duty in Pappalardo
relates to the agreement.
The majority finding that the tenancy clause created "a condition precedent to the
plaintiff's obligation to purchase the premises," S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53
N.Y.2d at 463, 425 N.E.2d at 845, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 457, poses still another problem. If the
clause had the effect of making the contract executory until the condition precedent was
fulfilled, as the court seems to indicate, then its entire analysis after this point was un-
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cause the condition was not met, the buyer's refusal to close title
on that date was warranted."
With respect to the allegations of bad faith asserted by both
parties, the court of appeals took the position that there was no
bad faith on either side.42 To clarify its position and to vitiate
necessary. The court could have entirely omitted its discussion of Haffey v. Lynch, 143
N.Y. 241, 38 N.E. 298 (1894), see infra text accompanying notes 50-56, as well as its
discussion of the remedy limitation clause. Its sole basis for the decision could have been
that the seller continued to be obligated under the contract. The seller breached the
contract by refusing to convey title as promised. Since he is now able to convey title, he
should be compelled to do so.
Therefore, the court could not have meant to characterize the termination of the
tenancy as a condition precedent. What the court probably meant is that seller could not
charge the buyer with a breach if the latter refused to close because of the defect, not
that the contract remains indefinitely executory until the seller removes the impediment
or the buyer cancels. See the trial court's discussion in this regard infra at note 41.
41. The trial court, however, did not agree with this conclusion. See supra note 17.
The trial court stated:
[TIhe contract also provided that the buyer would not be obligated to close title
until the Somonetti-Moscatiello [sic] lease was cancelled. This last provision did
not, however, make the closing date open-ended. A much clearer contractual expression of consent by the seller to such an open-ended closing as here found
would be necessary before such a gross deviation from normal commercial practice
is recognized (see 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 556). Rather, a contractual provision
stating that the plaintiff would not be obligated to close title until the SimonettiMoscatiello appeal was finally resolved and the lease terminated must be understood as a recognition of the commercial practice of signing contracts for the sale
of real property though marketable title has yet to be perfected, and as a further
explication of the contractual provision which limited the buyer's remedies in the
event that the seller was unable to convey clear title at the closing. The handwritten rider concerning the termination of the Simonetti-Moscatiello appeal further
defined the "good title" to be here conveyed. An outstanding Simonetti-Moscatiello lease at the time of the closing triggered plaintiff's contractual election of
remedies. Termination of the lease was not a condition of the contract, the failure
of which would excuse plaintiff's duty of performance. Instead, an outstanding
lease at the time of closing as set in the contract required a reasonable adjournment in the time set for the concurrent performances.
S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Papalardo [sic], 183 N.Y.L.J. 54, Mar. 19, 1980, at 13, col. 2
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 6, 1980) (emphasis added). With respect to the last sentence, the
trial court went on to hold that by "[flailing to attend the adjourned closing [rescheduled by the seller] and instead instituting suit, plaintiff waived any objections it may
have had to being required by defendant to perform on that date." Id. at col. 2. Finally,
the trial court concluded that "(b)y instituting such a suit seeking an abatement in price
in contravention of the contract itself, plaintiff deprived itself of the right to compel
defendant to specifically perform. Plaintiff's suit was thus, in effect, an election to receive back its down payment and title examination cost." Id. at col. 2 (emphasis added).
42. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d 455, 425 N.E.2d 841, 442
N.Y.S.2d 453 (1981). Although the court of appeals did not expressly state that the
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contrary remarks by the dissent and the trial court,4 the majority made several references to the buyer's freedom from blameworthiness throughout its opinion.44
The majority stated that the buyer had the right to sue the
seller for his alleged failure to comply with the conditions of the
contract.46 The buyer's right to seek judicial enforcement of his
claim arose at the closing, but his entitlement to specific performance had to await the favorable adjudication of the substantive issue: the buyer's charge that it was always within the power
of the seller to convey good title, and that seller's bad faith was
primarily responsible for the presence of the defect at the time
of the closing.' 6 It became unnecessary to adjudicate the buyer's
charges, however, since, at the time of the trial, the objections to

title had been removed.'7 The court of appeals held, therefore,
that if the court satisfied itself as to the present existence of a
valid unexecuted contract, whose terms were now sought to be
enforced by a party acting in good faith, a court of equity would
enforce it.48 It is immaterial that the seller was unable to convey
good title when the action was started, as long as he can do so at

the time of the trial.49

buyer was free from bad faith, this conclusion can be inferred from the fact that the
court went on to interpret the remedy limitation clause. Id.
43. The trial court stated explicitly that there was no reason to suspect the seller of
bad faith. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Papalardo [sic], 183 N.Y.L.J. 54, Mar. 19, 1980, at 13,
col. 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 6, 1980), but it made no express statement exculpating the
buyer. On the contrary, several of the trial court's remarks can be construed as characterizations of the buyer's lack of good faith. Id. at col. 2. Judge Fuchsberg, throughout
his dissenting opinion, makes similar observations. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo,
53 N.Y.2d at 472, 425 N.E.2d at 850, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 462 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting); see
infra note 69.
44. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 466, 468, 425 N.E.2d at 84748, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 459-60. In its concluding remarks, reversing the lower courts' decisions, the court made the following comment: "[o]n the record in the present case, ...
plaintiff has done nothing other than pursue the remedies available to it in aid of requiring defendant to abide by his agreement.
Id. at 468, 425 N.E.2d at 848, 442
N.Y.S.2d at 460.
45. Id. at 466-67, 425 N.E.2d at 847, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 459.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 467, 425 N.E.2d at 847, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 459.
48. Id. at 462, 425 N.E.2d at 844-45, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 457.
49. Id. at 464-65, 425 N.E.2d at 846, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 458. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on WAsREN's WEED NEw YORK RAL PROPERTY, which states:

It is a general rule in equity that the specific performance of a contract to convey
real estate will not be granted where the vendor in consequence of a defect in his
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The court of appeals relied on the case of Haffey v. Lynch5"
for this proposition. In Haffey, seller contracted to convey some
land to the buyer, by the usual deed containing full covenants
with warranty."1 At the time of contracting, the seller was able
to comply with the terms of the contract.5" Subsequently, however, a third person brought an action of ejectment against the
seller, and filed a lis pendens.'s After the seller refused to con-

vey, the buyer, aware of the claim and lis pendens, brought an
action for specific performance." Before that suit came up for
trial, the ejectment suit was tried and conclusively determined
in favor of the seller, thereby removing the encumbrance. 5 The
court of appeals, reversing the lower court, held that the buyer
was entitled to specific performance since the title defect was
cured when the action came to trial, and the court was in a posi56
tion to make an effective order for the requested relief

title is unable to perform. However, the rule has no application to a case where
the defect has disappeared at the time of the trial and the court can then give an
effective judgment for the equitable relief demanded. A plaintiff in an equity action should not lose his day in court because of any defense interposed to his
action, if at the time of the trial, the facts are such that if he then commenced his
action, he would be entitled to the equitable relief sought. If a vendor has no title
or a defective title to land which he contracts to sell, and subsequently obtains a
perfect title, he can be compelled by his vendee to perform his contract.
There is no reason why the vendor should not be compelled to perform if he
perfects his title while the action for specific performance is pending. A perfect
title by the vendor is not necessary to the vendee's cause of action, and he is just
as much entitled to the equitable relief, and the equity court is just as competent
to give it, whether the title of the vendor was perfected before or after the commencement of the action. Furthermore, where objections to title are cured prior
to determination on the trial, a party may be required to specifically perform.his
contract.
5 0. WARREN, G. MARKUSON, J. ZETr & J. GUBALA, WARREN'S WEED NEW YORK REAL
PROPERTY § 9.05 (4th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). It should be noted that the court cites
this authority before considering the effect of the remedy limitation clause. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 464-65, 425 N.E.2d at 846, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 458.
As the dissent points out, id. at 471, 425 N.E.2d at 849, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 462 (Fuchsberg,
J., dissenting), there is nothing in this quotation to indicate that the text writer would
have applied the above principles to a contract that does contain such a clause. Id.
50. 143 N.Y. 241, 38 N.E. 298 (1894).
51. Id. at 244, 38 N.E. at 298.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 249, 38 N.E. at 300. There are several other cases that make the same
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The initial stage of the court's analysis established that the
buyer could be entitled to the relief of specific performance because the lease was surrendered prior to trial.57 Having established that the relief could be granted, the court of appeals addressed the crucial issue: whether the presence of the remedy
limitation clause deprived the buyer of his right to specific performance. 58 Because the issue was one of first impression, the
court had to rely on its own judicial interpretation to arrive at
its holding that the clause did not act to deprive the buyer of
this remedy.59
The application of the remedy limitation clause depended
on the presence of two factors: first, seller's inability to convey
title in accordance with the terms of the contract, and second,
that this inability to convey was not caused by any act of bad
faith." If there were no dispute concerning the presence of either factor at the time of closing, then the rights and obligations
of both parties would become fixed. 1 Had that been the case in
Pappalardo,even the majority would probably have denied specific performance on the grounds that it was implicity excluded
by the clause. 2

point as Hafley. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Haggerty, 189 N.Y. 481, 82 N.E. 503 (1907);
Kahn v. Chapin, 152 N.Y. 305, 46 N.E. 489 (1897).
57. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 464-66, 425 N.E.2d at 845-47,
442 N.Y.S.2d at 458-59.
58. Id. at 466, 425 N.E.2d at 847, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 459. Had the contract not contained the remedy limitation clause, there would have been ample authority to indicate
specific performance as the appropriate remedy. See supra note 49.
59. Id. at 462, 425 N.E.2d at 844-45, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 457. See infra note 89. It
should be noted that the doctrine of stare decisis is less important in the context of an
action brought in equity, than in an action brought at law. Thus, equitable relief cannot
be demanded as a matter of right upon proving the same facts that constituted the basis
for granting an equitable remedy in an earlier case. As the court points out in Pappalardo, an equitable remedy such as specific performance is within the "judicial discretion" of the court, and a judgment will not be disturbed unless it appears to have been
"arbitrary" or wrong "as a matter of law." Id. at 468, 425 N.E.2d at 848, 442 N.Y.S.2d at
460; see Rosenberg v. Haggerty, 189 N.Y. 481, 82 N.E. 503 (1907). Nevertheless, the principles of consistency and precedent are desirable objectives in all parts of the law, and
the presence of countless citations in most equity cases confirms this conclusion. See
generally H. MCCLINTOCK, PRINCIPLES OF EQurrY § 23 (2d ed. 1948) (a general discussion
of the history of the discretionary power of the chancellor.).
60. See S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 460, 425 N.E.2d at 843,
442 N.Y.S.2d at 455; See supra text accompanying note 14.
61. Id. at 467, 425 N.E.2d at 847, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 459-60.
62. Id. The court does not discuss this point expressly. It would seem, however, that
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In Pappalardo,however, there was sharp disagreement between buyer and seller at the time of closing concerning both
critical factors.'e First, the buyer disputed whether the seller
had the ability to convey." Second, the buyer charged the seller
with bad faith in failing to take appropriate action to secure a
release from the tenants prior to the closing. 6
The majority held that the remedy limitation clause related
only to procedural remedies, not to substantive rights." Thus,
the buyer's right to seek a judicial resolution of the critical substantive issues-whether the seller could give good title and
whether the seller acted in good or bad faith-was not barred by
the clause.6 7 Because of these disputed issues, the buyer's election was postponed until after trial."8 In Pappalardo,the contingency envisaged by the clause never arose because the seller was
found to have acted in good faith,6 9 the title defect was cured at

if the buyer initially acknowledged the presence of both factors, and then, before either
one of the two options was fulfilled, decided to institute an action, the court would not
allow the remedy of specific performance. The court would probably not allow a buyer to
change his mind, since that in itself would be inequitable.
63. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 467, 425 N.E.2d at 847, 442
N.Y.S.2d at 460.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 466, 425 N.E.2d at 847, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 459.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 467, 425 N.E.2d at 847, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 460.
69. Id. Implicit in the court's decision to grant equitable relief is a determination
that a party seeking equitable relief must present himself to the court with "clean
hands." See id. at 468, 425 N.E.2d at 848, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 460. Surprisingly, the court
did not state this expressly. Instead, it made some indirect references in this regard. See
supra note 46.
The issue of bad faith was a threshold factor in this case because its presence on
either side would affect the substantive rights of both parties. Thus, if the seller had
dealt in bad faith, he would not have been able to avail himself of the protection afforded by the remedy limitation clause because the clause limits the buyer's remedies
only in situations where "for any reason not the fault of the seller, hereunder, seller
cannot convey title in accordance with the terms of the contract." Id. at 460, 425 N.E.2d
at 843, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 455.
The seller had claimed that the relief of specific performance should be denied because the buyer delayed in the commencement of the action and unfairly took advantage
of rising property values. A court of equity will not grant specific performance to a plaintiff who takes his time in bringing the action until the subject matter increases in value.
Equity will generally not allow a party to sleep on his rights if such sleep is prejudicial to
the interests of the other party. Prejudicial delay, or laches, is a defense to specific performance. "Equity aids [only] the vigilant." H. McCLINrocK, PRINCIPLES oF EQuITY § 28
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the time of the trial, and the seller was able to convey good title
according to the terms of the contract. 70 The presence of the
clause, therefore, did not affect the outcome of this case.71
V.

The Dissent: Construing the Provision as an Absolute
Termination Clause

Contrary to the majority's position, the dissent viewed the
remedy limitation clause as an irrevocable contract termination
provision.7 2 This would require the buyer to always make his
election at the time of closing, whether or not he conceded that
the seller was in good faith in being unable to convey good
title.7 3 The dissent noted that the purpose of the clause was to
obviate disputes and minimize the risks of litigation. 4 In the
event the seller could not convey good title, the operation of the
clause would serve to terminate the rights and obligations of
both parties at the closing.75 Therefore, the dissent maintained
that even though the clause would not prevent a buyer from
starting a lawsuit,76 it would remove the incentive to initiate a

(2d ed. 1948). The dissent charges that "the majority's claim, that there is no unjust
advantage to the seller here because the 'action was instituted within two weeks of the
aborted closing....' misses the point. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d
at 472, 425 N.E.2d at 850, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 462 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). According to
the dissent, there was "unjust advantage" to the seller because of the "delay which...
occurred between the closing and the actual adjudication." Id. The buyer having brought
his action within two weeks of the aborted closing was found by the court not to have
taken unwarranted advantage of the seller. Id. at 466, 425 N.E.2d at 847, 442 N.Y.S.2d at
459. The fact that there was a delay before the action was tried was not the buyer's fault.
Thus, the majority held that he should not be denied the opportunity to seek a resolution of his claim because of the delay in the judicial process. Id.
70. See S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 467, 425 N.E.2d at 847,
442 N.Y.S.2d at 459.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 469, 425 N.E.2d at 848, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 460 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 470, 425 N.E.2d at 849, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 461 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). It
has been said that "[it is] the unalienable right of any person to start a lawsuit. .. ."
Minister, Reformed Protestant Dutch Church v. Madison Ave. Bldg. Co., 214 N.Y. 268,
279, 108 N.E. 444, 447 (1915). This right is only circumscribed by a subsequent finding
that the plaintiff's suit was "spurious" or "frivolous." When a court characterizes a lawsuit by these or similar terms it will dismiss the case. In addition, the defendant may be
able to recover, in a separate action, the fees paid to his attorney and all the costs incurred in connection with defending the original action. See, e.g., Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D.
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suit solely predicated on baseless assertions of bad faith, since if
the buyer's charge of bad faith proved to have been baseless, he
would stand to lose the right to receive the property even without an abatement. According to the dissent's analysis, if the
buyer is not satisfied with the title tendered at the time of the
closing, he must, nevertheless, make a preclusive election under
the clause. He cannot postpone this election until after it is judicially determined that "for any reason not the fault of the seller
hereunder, seller cannot convey,

77

since the election is triggered

by the "objective fact" that there exists a title defect, and not by
78
the allegations of either party that it does, or does not exist.

The dissent claims that the buyer is generally not entitled to
bring suit.7 9 If, however, he did sue and proved that "some act of

bad faith on the part of the seller had relegated [him] to a
choice between a bad title and the deposit" then, the dissent
admits "that a court of equity might [seek] to right the wrong as
of the time of trial when the bad faith was first established."80
In Pappalardo,the buyer's failure to take the tendered title, his first option under the clause, implicitly constituted an
election to receive his down payment deposit, the remaining option under the clause. 81 Accordingly, "[wlhen either of these op461, 71 N.W. 558 (1897).
77. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 469, 425 N.E.2d at 848, 442
N.Y.S.2d at 460-61 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 473, 425 N.E.2d at 850, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 462-63 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
79. See id. at 469, 425 N.E.2d at 848, 42 N.Y.S.2d at 460-61 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). See supra note 69.
80. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo 53 N.Y.2d at 473, 425 N.E.2d at 851, 442
N.Y.S.2d at 463 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
81. Id. The dissent stated: "by refusing to take the property at the time of closing,
the buyer elected the refund and his rights became fixed accordingly." Id. It will be
noted that the dissent's reasoning is somewhat different from that of the trial court
which declared that "[bly instituting. . . a suit seeking an abatement in price in contravention of the contract itself, plaintiff deprived itself of the right to compel defendant to
specifically perform. Plaintiff's suit was thus, in effect, an election to receive back its
down payment and title examination costs. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Papalardo [sic), 183
N.Y.L.J. 54, Mar. 19, 1980, at 13, col. 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 6, 1980). As the majority
notes, the causal connection between instituting a suit seeking an abatement, and depriving oneself of the right to ask for specific performance is tenuous or "unsound."
S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y. 468, 425 N.E.2d at 848, 442 N.Y.S.2d at
460.
The trial court's statement may be read as an implication of bad faith by the buyer,
see supra note 43. It may, alternatively, be read as implying that the contract was repudiated and rescinded by the initiation of a suit seeking a remedy barred by its terms.
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tions is fulfilled, the affair is at an end. .... ,,82 The buyer's institution of an "unmerited suit" could not operate to allow him
to benefit from the disappearance of the defect at the time such
suit was tried. 8 Thus, the dissent seeks to remove the incentive
for bringing actions which are aimed at exploiting the changing
conditions of the real estate market at the seller's expense by
postponing the contractually mandated election until after the
trial, which in many cases may mean several years."

The latter meaning seems to come closest to what the trial court meant. This conclusion
is supported by the court's reliance on Renol Holding Corp. v. Lankenau, 116 N.Y.S.2d
861, 865-66 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1952) which states that:
To allow a party to disaffirm the contract on one hand, and then later, on the
other hand, to demand its enforcement is to shift all hazard to the other party to
the contract, and is contrary to equitable principles. To countenance such a
course of action. . . would have the effect of obligating the defendants to hold the
land indefinitely under the option, without receiving the down payment agreed
upon, and subject them to be summoned to appear in an action for specific performance, at the whim of the plaintiff ....
A purchaser will not be permitted
without the consent of the seller to hold a land contract open indefinitely after the
closing date and then have it specifically enforced.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). However, that case dealt with an option to
purchase real property, where payment on the deposit check was stopped by the purchaser, and thus constituted a repudiation of the contract. In Pappalardo,the deposit
was being held by the seller's attorney. See supra note 11.
In the final analysis, as the majority points out, the proper interpretation pursuant
to New York statutory provisions should have been that the buyer exercised his procedural right to demand alternative relief. Such a request does not in any way prejudice the
plaintiff's rights. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 30.17(a) (McKinney 1974); see also 55 N.Y.
Jur.Specific Performance § 3 (1967), which states in part:
Although the courts in some other states have considered a suit for damages for
breach of contract to be inconsistent with an action for specific performance, this
is apparently not true in New York, where it has been held that an action for
specific performance and an action for breach of contract are not inconsistent,
since both recognize the existence of the contract.
Id. Furthermore, even the dissent acknowledged that if the seller is proven to have dealt
in bad faith, the buyer could succeed when he asks for an abatement. S.E.S. Importers,
Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 473, 425 N.E.2d at 851, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 463 (Fuchsberg,
J., dissenting). See also id. at 463 n.2, 425 N.E.2d at 845 n.2, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 457 n.2.
82. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 470, 425 N.E.2d at 849, 442
FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY § 1.5 (3d ed. 1975)).

N.Y.S.2d at 461 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (citing M.

83. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 472, 425 N.E.2d at 850, 442
N.Y.S.2d at 462 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
84. Id. See supra note 69.
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Analysis

The majority and the dissent disagree on the issue of
whether the buyer was justified in bringing a lawsuit. The majority's position is that the suit was warranted because there was
a dispute concerning the factors that determine the clause's applicability;8 5 it would seem illogical to require the buyer to elect
a remedy under a clause that may be wholly inapplicable. 6 It
would have been quite difficult to convince the buyer that a
clause which begins with "If, for any reason not the fault of the
seller," requires that he make a preclusive election before he has
had a chance to challenge the clause's applicability in a court of
law. The dissent maintains that the suit was unmerited since "it
is now conclusively established, by way of an affirmed finding of
fact, that the seller at all times acted in good faith ' 87 and, therefore, the rights of the parties became fixed at the time of
88
closing.
Close analysis reveals that the dissent's logic, as the majority points out, "finds no support in the clause itself . . "..89
The

85. Id. at 467, 425 N.E.2d at 847, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 459-60. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47.
86. See supra text accompanying note 60.
87. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 470, 425 N.E.2d at 849, 442
N.Y.S.2d at 461 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). See supra note 69.
88. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 473, 425 N.E.2d at 850-51,
442 N.Y.S.2d at 463 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 467, 425 N.E.2d at 847, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 459. The facts in Pappalardo
have not been encountered in previous New York cases. Thus, the cases cited in the
opinion do not lend direct support to the majority and dissenting opinions.
Although the majority position is recognized as the correct one, the Halley case,
which the majority relies upon, does not lend direct support for the majority's position.
As the dissent correctly points out, in Haffey there was no clause limiting the remedies
of the purchaser.
The cases cited by the dissent, like Hafley, are also distinguishable upon their facts
from the present case. In Scerbo v. Robinson, 63 A.D.2d 1096, 406 N.Y.S.2d 370 (1978),
the plaintiff sought to compel specific performance of a contract of sale for real property;
or in the alternative, an abatement in the contract price if the title was imperfect. The
contract also provided that "[i]n the event the Seller is unable to convey title in accordance with the terms of this agreement, Seller's sole liability will be to refund the
amount paid on account of the purchase price. . . .Id. at 1096, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 370-76.
Although the contract stated that there were twenty-five acres, a survey disclosed that
the property to be transferred pursuant to the contract consisted of only seventeen acres.
The court, relying on the case of Artstrong Homes, Inc. v. Vasa, 23 Misc. 2d 608, 201
N.Y.S.2d 138 (1960), concluded that the sole remedy available to the plaintiff was the
return of his deposit.
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57

dissent recognizes that the provisions of the clause are inapplicaIn Scerbo, however, the plaintiff-buyer did not allege that the deficiency in the acreage was an attempt to deceive him; bad faith was not an issue. Furthermore, the acreage
deficiency did not disappear at the time of the trial. There is nothing in the majority's
opinion in Pappalardothat contradicts the holding in Scerbo. Scerbo, however, stands
only for the proposition that a clause limiting a purchaser's remedies is valid and fully
enforceable. The majority in Pappalardoagrees with that basic notion. Its main argument is that if there is a dispute concerning the applicability of the clause, then compliance with its terms should await judicial determination of the disputed issue. The majority opinion clearly indicates that it would have reached a different conclusion in
Pappalardoif the contract had contained an explicit provision whereby the buyer agreed
to relinquish his right to the remedy of specific performance in all contingencies. Its
conclusion was primarily based on the fact that the contract in Pappalardocontained no
such explicit provision. The court simply held that the clause was not broad enough to
preclude a court of equity from exercising its discretion to grant the remedy.
The dissent's reference to Artstrong Homes, Inc. v. Vasa, 23 Misc. 2d 608, 201
N.Y.S.2d 138 (1960), is also distinguishable from Pappalardoon the ground that it does
not purport to preclude a plaintiff who alleges bad faith by the seller from instituting a
lawsuit. In Artstrong, as in Scerbo, there was no dispute regarding the validity of the
seller's inability to convey. In Artstrong, the seller warranted that the subject parcel of
vacant land "is a proper building plot on which a one family residence can be erected
and maintained." Id. at 610, 201 N.Y.S.2d at 140. The closing meeting broke up without
adjournment when it appeared that the subject parcel was not a proper building plot
according to zoning authorities. After the aborted closing, the defendant contracted to
sell the property to a third person. The court dismissed the action for specific performance by the original buyer stating that the rights of the parties, under the same remedy
limitation provision as in Scerbo, were fixed on the closing date. Id. at 612, 201 N.Y.S.2d
at 141. Accordingly, the plaintiff-buyer was adjudged to be entitled only to the return of
his deposit. Id.
An analysis of the facts in Artstrong reveals that there was no dispute concerning
the seller's inability to convey the contracted title on the closing date. While the seller
did allege that the authorities were in error in their interpretation of the applicable zoning ordinances, he conceded that their rejection of the application rendered the title
doubtful in view of the provision which warranted that the land was "a proper building
plot on which a one family residence can be erected and maintained." Id. at 611, 201
N.Y.S.2d at 140. Pappalardo"was not a case in which both parties acknowledged on the
date of the closing that the seller was unable to give good title .... " S.E.S. Importers,
Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 467, 425 N.E.2d at 847, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 459-60, which
is, according to the majority "the prerequisite for invoking the restricted remedies
clause." Id. If there was no question concerning the seller's inability to convey good title
and, therefore, the applicability of the clause, the court could have properly stated that
the parties' rights were fixed on the closing date. Given those facts, the majority in Pappalardo would not disagree.
Lanna v. Greene, 175 Conn. 453, 399 A.2d 837 (1978), is another case cited by the
dissent. In Lanna, there was a dispute concerning the seller's good faith, and his alleged
inability to convey unencumbered title. The buyer alleged that the seller was at fault
because he knew of a lease on the property but failed to disclose it before the contract
was signed. The buyer further alleged, that subsequent to the execution of the contract
with plaintiff, seller purported to rely on the lease as an excuse for his nonperformance.
The suit was initiated before the closing date, and the buyer sought a declaratory judg-
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ble if the seller has acted in bad faith. It concedes, therefore,
that the buyer would have succeeded if he had sued "for specific
performance of the unencumbered property, or, in the alternative, for specific performance of the encumbered property with
an abatement . . . but only if the seller had been guilty of bad

faith."'0 The problem with this position, however, is that the
dissent does not acknowledge the buyer's right to sue on the
contract. 1
If the plain reading of the remedy limitation clause dictates
a preclusive election at the closing, as the dissent claims, how
will the buyer ever get a chance to prove his allegations concerning the seller's bad faith? The buyer's failure to make his election at the closing is in defiance of his obligations and, in the
dissent's vernacular, constituted the buyer's attempt to "follow a
course of 'heads I win, tails you lose.' ",92 These characterizations
of the buyer's conduct do not connote equitable conduct, good
faith, or "clean hands," the prerequisites to obtaining equitable
relief.' 3 While acknowledging "that a court of equity might
[seek] to right the wrong" when a seller's bad faith forces a
buyer to make an election, 4 the dissent does not describe the
circumstances that would warrant a court of equity's retention

ment setting aside the lease in order to enable the seller to convey to him an unencumbered title.
The primary distinction between Lanna and Pappalardowas the seller's willingness
in Lanna to convey the property to the buyer, even at the time of the trial, subject to the
interests of the lessee. In Pappalardo,the seller was vigorously opposed to the granting
of specific performance at the time of the trial. The Lanna court states expressly that it
does not decide "whether, under the terms of this contract, the plaintiffs could have
delayed their election of remedies pending a determination of the validity of the encumbrance. The record does not reveal that the defendants. . . demanded such an election
on the performance date ....
" Lanna v. Greene, 175 Conn. at 462 n.2, 399 A.2d at 842
n.2. By this statement, the Lanna court clearly declines to adjudicate the precise issue
which the dissent seeks to support by invoking the authority of the case.
90. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 473, 425 N.E.2d at 851, 442
N.Y.S.2d at 463 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
91. See id. at 472, 425 N.E.2d at 850, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 462 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). The dissent refers to the buyer's action as an "unmerited suit" because he was
"seeking a choice to which [he] had no right" at the time when he commenced suit. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. A plaintiff will be denied equitable relief if he comes into court with "unclean hands." H. MCCLINTOCK, PRINCIPLES OF EQurTY § 26 (2d ed. 1948). It is well established that "he who seeks equity, must do equity." Id. at § 25.
94. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 473, 425 N.E.2d at 851, 442
N.Y.S.2d at 468 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
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of what is always initially an "unmerited lawsuit. 9 5
There is another related point to consider. The dissent
characterizes the remedy limitation clause as a "standard termination provision"; upon the buyer's election, the contract became null and void.96 Furthermore, the dissent considers the
clause to be self-executing. If the buyer did not make an explicit
election, his nonelection would be construed as an implicit election to a return of his money.97 The contract, therefore, became
null and void after the closing." Thus, the question raised earlier becomes even more difficult: how can any court entertain an
action that is based on a contract which is "null and void" for all
practical purposes?
Additional inconsistencies in the dissent's analysis are
found in an examination of the remedy limitation clause. The
dissent's assertion that the buyer had no right to sue, appears to
be precluded by the wording of the clause. Words such as
"fault," and "bad faith," are legal conclusions and, therefore,
cannot be termed as "objective facts" unless they were adjudicated to be so by a court of law.'9 Thus, by using the word "if"
in conjunction with "fault," the clause implicitly indictates that
its applicability is subject to prior judicial determination. These
questions were never addressed in the dissent's analysis.
It should be noted that the majority and the dissent in Pappalardo disagree only on the extent of the clause's applicability.
The majority concedes that to a certain degree, the clause does
effectively limit the buyer's remedies.10 0 The majority, however,
limits the clause's applicability to "circumstance[s] there described": when "for any reason not the fault of the seller," the
seller cannot convey. 101 The majority recognizes that the buyer
gave up a substantial remedy by assenting to the inclusion of the

95. See supra text accompanying note 80.
96. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 469, 425 N.E.2d at 848, 442
N.Y.S.2d at 460 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting); see M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY § 1.5 (3d ed. 1973).
97. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.

98. Id.
99. See generally 37 AM. JUR. 2d Fraud & Deceit § 468 (1968) (general discussion of
sufficiency of proof).
100. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 466, 425 N.E.2d at 847, 442
N.Y.S.2d at 459.
101. Id.
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remedy limitation clause: the conveyance of the defective title
with a reduction in the purchase price.102 The buyer agreed,
however, to deprive himself of this remedy only if the seller acted in good faith.1 03 It is fair to assume that if the buyer knew
that the seller would act in bad faith, he would not have agreed
to a provision giving the seller a method to back out of the deal
with impunity. If, as the dissent maintains, the buyer must always make an election, and may not bring a suit, the good faith
qualification of the clause, bargained for by the buyer, is meaningless and entirely worthless to a "clause abiding," nonsuing
buyer. This result could not have been within the buyer's
intention.
The majority's conclusion, as the dissent maintains, does
not increase the risks of unmerited litigation. When a buyer
brings a suit alleging defective title and bad faith by the seller,
the court can reach one of two results. First, if the court finds
that there was no defect and the buyer's suit was brought in bad
faith, it could rectify the situation so that the buyer's unjust delay would not result in his benefit or harm the seller.'" Second,
if there was a defect which persisted at the time of the trial, the
buyer could elect to take the property "as is" without an abatement, or to rescind. 0 5 According to the dissent, the buyer, in
this situation, is limited to a refund of his deposit.'" The dissent's fear of groundless suits seems to be unwarranted, since
the buyer would gain only a postponement of the mandated
election. The dissent is concerned that a postponement of the
election would give the buyer an undeserved leverage against
fluctating conditions in the real estate market.10 7 If the property
has appreciated after the closing, the buyer may force the sale.
If the prices have gone down, however, "any title imperfection
presumably would allow [him] to fully recoup the ... funds...
102. Id.
103. Id. See supra note 40 for discussion of Mokar Properties Corp. v. Hall, 6

A.D.2d 536, 179 N.Y.S.2d 814 (1st Dep't 1958).
104. "Equity will not suffer a wrong without a remedy." See H. MCCLINTOCK, PRINCPLES OF EQurry § 29 (2d ed. 1948).
105. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 467, 425 N.E.2d at 847, 442
N.Y.S.2d at 459.
106. See supra text accompanying note 81.
107. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 472, 425 N.E.2d at 850, 442
N.Y.S.2d at 462 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
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advanced."10 8 This analysis, however, ignores an important factor. If real estate values are down and the buyer seeks to withdraw, it follows that the seller is anxious to dispose of the property at the contract price. Thus, if it becomes evident to a court
of equity that a buyer, in his quest to speculate, raised any title
imperfection as a pretext for his procrastination, a court could
grant the seller the remedy of specific performance. In other
words, the court would force the buyer to purchase the property,
with an abatement for the implicitly insignificant title
imperfection.' 0 9
Considering all the possibilities, it is evident that the only
incentive a buyer may have to sue is the hope that a material
title defect may disappear at the time of trial. In such a case,
however, the dissent would have to agree that suits alleging bad
faith will continue, in the hope that the court will find bad faith,
and will grant the remedy of specific performance." 0
VII.

Conclusion

The case of S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo,'" stands
for the proposition that as long as the person seeking specific
performance has acted in good faith, a court of equity should
grant his request, unless there are some valid defenses against it,
or the plaintiff has relinquished his right to the remedy in an
unequivocally explicit contractual provision." 2 The majority
found that neither one of the two factors was present. Accordingly, it held for the buyer."'
108. Id.
109. The basis for granting the remedy of specific performance in contracts for the
sale of real estate is predicated upon the uniqueness of land and the inadequacy of the
legal remedy of money damages. Although these reasons are inapplicable to a seller who
is seeking to dispose of his unique real property, on occassion a seller has been granted
specific performance with an abatement in an action against the buyer. In many of these
situations, the buyer is seeking to escape his obligation by relying on a slight default of
the seller as an excuse. See, e.g., Binder v. Hejhal, 347 Ill. 11, 178 N.E. 901 (1931);
Tolchester Beach Improvement Co. v. Boyd, 161 Md. 269, 156 A. 795, (1931); Keepers v.
Yocum, 84 Kan. 554, 114 P. 1063 (1911).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 80 and 94.
111. 53 N.Y.2d 455, 425 N.E.2d 841, 442 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1981).
112. S.E.S. Importers, Inc. v. Pappalardo, 53 N.Y.2d at 468, 425 N.E.2d at 848, 442
N.Y.S.2d at 460. The majority concedes that a buyer could relinquish his right to specific
performance in all contingencies, if such intent is unequivocally expressed. Id.
113. Id.
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The final adjudication of the issue of bad faith should not
be given retroactive effect as suggested by the dissent. The
buyer should not be denied access to court because of a remedy
limitation clause, which at best, is subject to dual interpretation.
To suggest otherwise, is to contravene the traditional standards,
114
not only of equity, but also of contract interpretation.
In the final analysis, the majority does not change the law;
it merely extends the rationale of past decisions to a previously
unencountered situation. The dissent fails to give any weight to
the basic legal and social principle that every person, right or
wrong in the final adjudication, has an elementary right to seek
a judicial resolution of his or her grievances unless he or she expressly, unequivocally and consciously contracted away this
right.1 15 It is very difficult to comprehend how the dissent can
interpret the clause as relinquishing this essential right.

114. If the terms of a contract are susceptible of two interpretations it is well established that the one which is more equitable, reasonable and rational should be given
preference. See, e.g., Lanna v. Greene, 175 Conn. 453, 399 A.2d 837 (1978).
115. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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